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Abstract 
Credit extension plays an integral role in improving access to finance and financial inclusion 
by availing funds for borrowers while generating revenue for lenders and depositors. 
Borrowers’ delinquency and low risk appetite for lenders contribute to mediocre levels of credit 
extension. Information asymmetry problems in the credit market normally lead to banks 
refraining from lending optimally thus hampering credit growth and profitability. Lenders can 
benefit from rich borrower credit history to make informed lending decisions and realise 
returns. The purpose of credit reporting systems is to facilitate exchange of  debtors’ credit 
information, thereby creating an opportunity for creditors to advance more funds and realise 
increasing profits while on the other hand, enabling borrowers to benefit from availability of 
loans.  
 
This study analysed quarterly data from 2007 to 2017 of banking industry in Lesotho to assess 
the impact of credit information sharing on bank profitability and credit growth using time 
series methods. The Johansen cointegation test was run to establish presence of long run 
relationship between variables following which the error correction model was applied to 
determine short run relationship.  
 
The results revealed no significant relationship between credit information sharing activity and 
bank profitability. There was however, a significant relationship between non-interest income 
and bank profits, highlighting ability of bank managers to diversify income streams. 
Furthermore, results showed negative and significant long-run relationship between bank credit 
growth and presence of credit information systems suggesting that banks were sceptical on 
lending given borrowers’ credit history. The study recommends that credit information from 
financial and non-financial institutions be fully shared with the credit bureau to enrich borrower 
credit reports. Public awareness on operations of credit bureau and potential implications of 
borrower credit history will instil discipline among borrowers and eventually improve of loan 
book quality.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction  
 
1.1.Background  
Banks are the nucleus of financial intermediation processes in every economy. Their core 
business is to mobilise funds through taking depositors’ money and transmitting it as loans to 
borrowers thereby stimulating productivity and economic growth. As banks play this 
intermediation role, they become liable to the depositors while, on the other hand, they realise 
returns on loan repayments from debtors. This means that banks must apply proper mechanisms 
to ensure that they retain depositors’ trust, extend credit safely and collect efficiently from their 
debtors on time. However, borrowers disrupt this intermediation process when they fail to make 
or delay repayments, thereby threatening overall levels of credit issued causing systemic 
repercussions. The global financial crisis of 2007-2008 saw bank asset quality declining across 
the world (Saeed & Zahid, 2016). This was caused by high volumes of loan repayments falling 
overdue because of increased costs of borrowing, rising unemployment or a decline in GDP, 
amongst others.  
 
Borrowers’ failure to repay loans further deteriorates banks’ capital and asset quality as non-
performing loans negatively affect banks’ capacity to continue their business of extending credit. 
Moreover, bank profitability suffers due to the increase in provisioning for loss, which further 
erodes their capital.  
 
Banks are at a risk of insolvency if they do not implement proper methods of mitigating credit 
risks. Borrower delinquency first erodes shareholders’ equity and subsequently depositors’ 
funds, thereby threatening to render banks bankrupt. This phenomenon is contagious  
(Schoenmaker, 1996) as other banks and sectors may suffer due to the insolvency of one bank. 
 
Banks could protect themselves against delinquent borrowers by obtaining information that 
indicates borrowers who may have difficulty in repaying in the future. However, when borrowers 
know that they might default, they tend to hide such information when applying for a loan. 
Information asymmetry problem in the credit market appears when  borrowers withhold 
information that prevents lenders from making informed decisions when granting loans. 
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This situation inhibits banks from growing their loan portfolios by creating adverse effects on 
their financial efficiency and economic performance (Kemei, 2014). Information asymmetry in 
credit markets results in credit risk and subsequent market failure. 
 
Credit risk in the banking industry requires strong mitigation measures. Lenders are able to 
mitigate credit risks when they have adequate information about their clients, however, if they 
lack important information about borrowers, they may refuse credit. Png (2013) asserts that 
managers of financial institutions refuse to lend to their clients when they are aware that they do 
not have sufficient information. This situation negates the purpose of financial intermediation, 
inclusion and overall access to finance. 
 
When banks have little information about the credit-worthiness of borrowers they implement 
credit-rationing mechanisms. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) assert that adverse selection in the loan 
market exists mainly due to different propensities of borrowers to pay back their loans. They 
claim that banks struggle to distinguish good borrowers from bad ones because they do not have 
screening mechanisms to do this. On the other hand, authorities issue corrective measures in the 
case of rising volumes of non-performing loans in the banking sector (Chiang, Finkelstein, Lee, 
& Rao, 1984). In this case, regulators instruct banks to cut back on new loan advances, to 
consolidate their loan books and increase provisions for non-performing loans. As a result, the 
ratio of total loans to GDP would decline, thereby affecting the country’s economic activity and 
growth. 
 
Microeconomic theory introduces mechanisms that address information asymmetry problems 
such as screening, appraisal, credit rationing and adverse selection. Screening is an approach 
where a less informed party develops ways to obtain necessary information about a better-
informed party. Another popular approach is loan appraisal. This approach works where 
information required about clients is inexpensively verifiable (Png, 2013). Banks perform loan 
appraisal through assessing a borrower’s creditworthiness and affordability; this can be done 
with credit bureau systems. 
 
The business of credit information institutions is to collect and consolidate positive and negative 
credit information about individual borrowers and exchange such information among creditors. 
This information is integrated in credit decision-making process. Borrower credit information 
allows credit providers to conduct comprehensive assessments of borrower risk and affordability 
prior to granting credit, thereby mitigating the problem of information asymmetry. Credit 
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providers, in this case banks, incur costs for making enquiries about clients however they may 
pass such costs to borrowers through fees and administrative charges incorporated in credit 
contracts. 
 
Several countries have established credit information systems to address the issue of information 
asymmetry while simultaneously promoting responsible borrowing. This initiative begins by 
promulgating a legal framework that lays ground rules for credit providers to share their clients’ 
credit information with a neutral institution, a credit information bureau or credit registry. The 
credit information bureau will in turn generate reports of individual borrowers for future 
reference by lenders. 
 
The availability of borrower credit information improves credit underwriting (Jappelli and 
Pagano, 2005). Researchers claim that if debtors’ credit history is available, credit providers can 
make better lending decisions (Kerage and Jangono, 2014). This supports the use of credit 
information bureaus as a mechanism that facilitates the exchange of borrower credit history. 
Credit information sharing further serves as an incentive (or disincentive) to good (or delinquent) 
borrowers. The exchange of borrowers’ credit information prompts them to build good credit 
records by servicing their loans appropriately (Behr & Sonnekalb, 2012). Borrowers develop 
discipline and commitments towards their financial obligations (Brown and Zehnder, 2006; 
Jappelli and Pagano, 2005). This supports an assertion that credit risk declines with the 
implementation of the credit reference systems in the financial sector (Fabritz, Falck, and 
Saavedra, 2018). 
 
As banks integrate the credit history of borrowers into credit decisions, they are able to price 
such credit properly, thereby making credit less expensive for good borrowers and pricier for 
delinquent ones. In this way, banks improve their asset quality and “earn economic profit on 
those customers” (Sharpe, 1990). Furthermore, credit approval rates rise when banks use credit 
information sharing systems. If banks adequately assess borrowers’ affordability, they will be 
able to grant affordable and adequate loans to borrowers depending on their risks and 
affordability. 
 
Banks will benefit further by realising good returns if they obtain and use information about their 
prospective clients in credit decision making (Png 2013). As a result of improved lending 
methods, banks will realise fewer NPLs, higher profitability ratios, improved capital strength and 
ultimately returns on initial investment. 
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Inadequacy of borrower credit information and lack of repayment enforcement mechanisms 
resulted in borrower delinquency and credit risk. This subsequently caused banking industry in 
Lesotho to suffer losses and as a result, banks refrained from issuing loans to their potential, thus 
depriving the market of a critical component to economic growth. According to the World Bank 
(2014), there are 126 countries across the world that have functioning credit bureaus or registries. 
Among these countries, 38 are in sub-Saharan Africa including Lesotho where a credit 
information system was set up in 2014. . Lesotho enacted the Credit Reporting Act in 2011 and 
developed a credit reporting system in 2013. This has arguably led to a reduction in levels of 
non-performing loans and subsequently increasing loanbook and improved financial 
performance of the banks as loan repayments improved. 
 
Establishment of credit bureau in Lesotho is not a solution on its own. Lenders should find value 
in using this mechanism, otherwise the challenges that banks faced will remain. As it is believed 
that credit reporting positively influences banks’ profitability (B. Kusi, Agbloyor, Fiador, & 
Osei, 2016) and lending volumes (James, Iraki, & Julius, 2017), it is expected that the banking 
industry will improve as a result of this initiative in Lesotho. Howeer, the impact that the use of 
this mechanism has on bank performance and creditgrowth in Lesotho has not been scientifically 
proved, hence the purpose of this study. If creditgrowth improves after operationalisation of 
credit bureaus, it could be that banks are able to assess borrowers’ affordability properly and 
provide loans to those who are credit-worthy, ceteris paribus. On the other hand, if creditgrowth 
rates decline, the argument could be that banks were lending to delinquent borrowers 
unknowingly due to absence of comprehensive borrower credit history.  
 
1.2. Problem statement 
Though banks play a pivotal role in any economy by mobilising funds through loans, borrowers’ 
defaults weaken their strength, thereby prompting for institutional and statutory mitigation 
measures. While loans and advances remain a fundamental source of business for banks across 
the world (Saeed & Zahid, 2016), failure of banks to manage credit granting and collection poses 
a serious risk, not only to institutional viability, but to the entire banking system and the 
economy.  
 
Balgova, Nies and Plekhanov (2016) suggest that economic growth, investment and employment 
grow when non-performing loans at banks decrease. Klein (2013) established that high NPLs 
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negatively affect the rate at which the economy recovers post shocks. When the economy 
experiences growing volumes of NPLs, banks refrain from granting credit. This results in slower 
loan book growth and rise in interest rates. This situation affects good borrowers as they would 
be reluctant to take highly priced loans, thereby inhibiting credit growth. 
 
Sharing borrower credit information improves bank profitability through interest income while 
motivating borrowers to service their loans faithfully, thus reducing loan default rates (B. Kusi 
et al., 2016).Without proper loan appraisal mechanisms, banks remain vulnerable to credit risks 
and have the dilemma of loan book growing vis-à-vis credit rationing. If banks grow their loan 
books, they run the risk of consumers over borrowing, bad asset quality and subsequent losses. 
Moreover,  regulatory requirements also force banks to build a bigger capital base to cushion 
against loss due to NPLs. This requires banks to withhold funds, as thus slowing economic 
activity in sectors that benefit from bank credit. The task facing banks is therefore to develop a 
means of appraising credit applications properly to minimise borrowers’ probability of default 
while extending credit to their potential.  
 
Government of Lesotho promulgated laws to facilitate exchange of borrower credit information 
among lenders. This is in an attempt to address information asymmetry problems in the credit 
market in Lesotho. While it is believed that by sharing borrower credit information, banks can 
improve their loan appraisal and screening in their lending processes (Büyükkarabacak & Valev, 
2012; James et al., 2017) it is worth finding out whether banks in Lesotho realise growing loan 
books and profit when borrower credit information is factored in their decision making process, 
thus, if credit information sharing is a solution to the credit impairment in the banking industry 
of Lesotho.  
This study investigated how bank profitability and credit extension reacted to credit information 
sharing in Lesotho. Acquiring such insights will help in policy advice towards financial stability 
and economic growth. ,  
 
1.3. Research questions 
This study explored the impact of credit reporting in Lesotho and addressed the following 
research questions: 
i. Do banks’ profitability respond to credit information sharing in Lesotho?  
ii. Do banks’ credit growth respond to credit information sharing in Lesotho? 
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This paper assesses the impact of using borrower credit history from the credit information 
bureaus prior to issuing credit by banks in Lesotho. It tests banks’ profitability and loan growth 
in the presence of credit information bureaus.  
 
1.4. Statement of research objectives and hypotheses  
The general objective of this paper is to assess the impact of employing credit bureau reports in 
appraising loan applications in banks in Lesotho. The specific objectives are as follows: 
 To assess the responsiveness of bank performance indicator to credit information bureau 
presence in Lesotho; 
 To assess the responsiveness of banks’ credit growth to credit information bureau 
presence in Lesotho. 
 
 
Hypothesis 1 
H0: The use of credit information sharing does not have impact on bank profitability in 
Lesotho; 
H1: The use of credit information sharing does has impact on bank profitability in Lesotho. 
 
Hypothesis 2 
H0: Bank credit growth in Lesotho does not respond to the use of credit information sharing;  
H1: Bank credit growth in Lesotho significantly responds to the use of credit information 
sharing. 
 
1.5. Research justification 
As banks offer credit and other financial products in the economy, they are exposed to various 
risks, among which is credit risk. The importance of credit information sharing in any economy 
has been largely emphasised in literature. Among its benefits, researchers cite improved bank 
loanbook growth and profitability.  
 
Lesotho enacted the Credit Reporting Act in 2011 and developed a credit reporting system in 
2013 to circumvent the problems associated with borrower information asymmetry and growing 
non-perfoming loans in the country. Borrower credit information sharing commenced in 2014 
comprising of information from four commercial banks, microfinance institutions and retail 
shops.Since this information is exchanged in Lesotho, the question is whether this system 
protects banks from customer delinquency and  losses. 
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This research investigates the effect of credit information sharing in addressing a problem of 
information asymmetry and market failure in the banking industry of Lesotho. The findings of 
this study shall provide evidence on the impact of using credit reporting systems on banks’ 
loanbook growth and profitability. By contributing to the existing literature on credit information 
sharing and bank performance, this research further presents policy advice for authorities and 
banks in the local and international context. 
 
To the best knowledge of the author, no study of this nature exists in the context of Lesotho. As 
thus, since inception of credit information sharing systems in the country, it has not yet been 
scientifically proved whether these systems are effective in addressing the problem at hand, this 
research aims to answer that question.  
 
 
1.6. Organisation of study 
The structure of the rest of this research paper is organised as follows: Chapter 2 expands on the 
banking industry and credit information sharing in Lesotho, this chapter further discusses 
theoretical framework and literature around the impact of credit information with regard to bank 
performance and credit extension. Chapter 3 prescribes research methodology to be used to 
investigate the research questions of this study. Chapter 4 presents and discusses empirical results 
of the study while chapter 5 summarises the study, it further provides recommendations and 
avenues for future research.  
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter lays a foundation for the subject of credit information sharing and bank 
performance. It discusses the background to and status quo of the banking industry in the context 
of Lesotho. The issue of banks’ performance is important as it relates to financial stability. 
Business makes sense if a return is realised over time. Highlighting the banks’ ability to raise 
revenue through credit extension, this chapter discusses the underlying impediments that affect 
the banking industry performance with regard to credit. 
 
2.2. Overview of Banking Industry in Lesotho 
The banking industry in Lesotho consists of four commercial banks, three of which originate 
from South Africa while the Government of Lesotho owns one. The Central Bank of Lesotho 
acts as a regulator of the entire financial sector, thus supervising banks and non-bank financial 
institutions. 
 
The legal framework for the banking industry in Lesotho has been shaped in the past 20 years 
with most reforms taking place within recent years. These reforms address structural disparities 
that were realised in the previous dispensation. A weak legal framework in the sector, coupled 
with risk mismanagement and low repayment levels, led to the demise of the Lesotho 
Agricultural and Development Bank and the then Lesotho Bank in the 1990s (Central Bank of 
Lesotho[CBL], 2000). 
 
A lack of competition among commercial banks in Lesotho characterised the sector, stifling the 
mobilisation of funds and productivity (World Bank[WB], 2004). Banks in Lesotho preferred 
holding treasury bills in South Africa rather than in Lesotho (CBL, 2000) as rates in Lesotho 
were less competitive (WB, 2004). Furthermore, deposit rates were lower in Lesotho than in 
South Africa while, on the contrary, service and lending rates were much higher in Lesotho (WB, 
2004). The lack of repayment enforcement mechanisms and the absence of borrowers’ credit 
histories forced banks to settle for treasury bills (CBL, 2005) as they refrained from issuing loans 
to their potential. 
 
Over years, the Government of Lesotho improved laws regulating the operations of banks to 
ensure safety and soundness of the entire financial sector. Currently, banks in Lesotho have 
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adopted Basel II and are in the process of incorporating Basel III. Below is a list of selected laws 
passed to ensure that the sector is safe for banks, depositors and borrowers: 
 
Table 1:Summary of laws strengthening financial sector in Lesotho 
Name  Objective 
1. Credit Reporting Act, 2011 To make provision for the use of credit information for 
risk management by credit providers and the Central 
Bank of Lesotho 
2. Financial Institutions (Lending 
limits) Regulations 2016 
To encourage banks to engage in financial intermediation 
in Lesotho and ensure funds raised locally grow a local 
economy. 
3. Liquidity Requirements 
Regulations 2016 
To ensure that the bank has in place liquidity 
management policies to enable it to meet its obligations 
and commitments when they fall due. 
4. Disclosure of bank charges and 
interest rates Regulations 2016 
To ensure that banks provide information on bank 
charges and interest rates to customers. 
5. Risk-based Capital Requirements 
Regulations 2016  
To prescribe for banks, capital adequacy ratios in line 
with levels of credit and market risks in the banking 
sector. 
6. Minimum Local Assets 
Requirements Regulations 2016 
To encourage banks to engage in financial intermediation 
in Lesotho and to ensure that funds raised locally grow 
the local economy.  
7. Banks Asset classification 
Regulations 2016  
To ensure that banks regularly evaluate their assets using 
objective classification criteria. 
 
2.2.1. Some stylised facts about banking industry in Lesotho 
This section presents a review of the Lesotho banking industry with regard to its size and 
performance trends. Lesotho banking industry has evolved over time as portrayed below. Apart 
from the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, the banking sector suffered surging non-
performing loans, which led to the liquidation of the Lesotho Bank. Post the 2008 global financial 
crisis, banks have built resilience and adopted policies to guard against such incidents. The sector 
has grown in size, performance, number of participants and products offered. 
 
2.2.1.1. Bank Size and Performance 
Currently sized at 13.3 billion Maloti in assets (CBL, 2015), these banks serve a client base of 
435,000 through a network of 44 branches (Government of Lesotho, 2013). The performance of 
the banking industry in Lesotho, as measured by total income, is at 1.5 billion Maloti. The main 
contributors of revenue are interest income from loans, commission income and income from 
placements. 
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2.2.1.2. Loan to deposit ratio and non-performing loans  
Loans to deposit ratio shows an upward trajectory in the past 15 years. This upward growth 
depicts increasing potential in lending for banks. Moreover, non-performing loans as a 
percentage of gross loans remained low and stable at 2.9% average between 2002 and 2016. High 
non-performing loans indicate problems in the economy as they erode bank profitability and 
solvency (Baudino & Yun, 2017). In general, there are signs suggesting that the credit crisis is 
less likely to occur in Lesotho in the current economic conditions (CBL, 2016). 
 
Though credit crisis is deemed unlikely in these situation, borrower defaults, if left unmanaged, 
could threaten the banking system in the future. There is therefore need to protect against possible 
delinquency by strengthening banks’ predictive power in credit extension processes. 
 
Figure 1 below depicts both loan to deposit ratio and non-performing loans trends over 15 years 
from January 2002 to September 2016. 
 
Figure 1:NPL Ratio and Loans to Deposit Ratio  
 
Source: Central Bank of Lesotho 
 
2.3. Credit Information Sharing in Lesotho 
The absence of adequate borrowers’ credit history in Lesotho negatively affected credit market 
activity and growth over the years. Incidences of serially delinquent borrowers and risks of 
lending grew that resulted in low credit extension in the country as banks shied away from 
investing in risky portfolios (CBL, 2012).  
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The promulgation of laws that established credit information sharing took place between 2011 
and 2013 after which a credit bureau named Compuscan (PTY) LTD obtained a license to 
operate. During 2014, Compuscan engaged commercial banks in identifying the required data, 
designing the banks’ interface and extraction of the required data. Simultaneously, other data 
providers began these processes even though their priority was on the banks. 
 
Credit report referrals effectively commenced in 2015 with around 123,000 credit records 
collected in the credit bureau database. This enabled credit information checks by commercial 
banks and other financial services providers.  
 
2.3.1. Some stylised facts on credit information sharing 
Borrowers’ credit history, consisting of information on mortgage loans, personal loans, housing 
loans and credit cards, formulated the credit information that is available and credit report checks 
by banks and other financial institutions have grown substantially. By the end of 2017, the 
commercial banks alone made over 13,000 enquiries from the credit bureaus, signalling a 
growing usage of credit information. The World Bank’s Doing Business rankings for Lesotho 
improved in 2016 as individuals amounting to 5% of the total adult population were captured in 
the credit bureau records (WB, 2016). Figure 2 shows the “getting credit” ratings and percentage 
of adults covered in the credit bureau for the country. Lesotho moved upwards in the ranks by 
70 places from 152 to 82 due to an improvement in credit-giving  
facilities (WB, 2016). At this stage, the credit records of 7.1% of the adult population are 
available in the bureau systems, further spreading the coverage of borrowers’ credit histories in 
Lesotho. 
 
The credit records of 144,000 individuals were shared between credit providers and credit 
bureaus in Lesotho in 2015 (CBL, 2015). Unsecured lending constituted 62% of loans issued in 
2017 indicating an increased appetite for lenders to issue loans closer to the edge. An increasing 
appetite for commercials banks to lend into asset backed loans is also 
 noted (CBL, 2016). Figure 2 below portrays the trend of credit information enquiries in Lesotho 
over the years under review: 
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Figure 2:Number of Credit Report Inquiries by creditors in Lesotho 
 
Source: Central Bank of Lesotho 
 
2.3.2. Doing Business Rankings-Lesotho  
Increasing volumes of data on the number of borrowers and credit accounts captured by the 
credit bureau system improves reliability of credit bureau data. The expectation is that an 
increase in the usage of borrowers’ credit information will result in declining credit risk and 
growth of loan books with the subsequent improvement in bank profitability. 
 
Figure 3:Doing business ranking extract for Lesotho 
 
Source: World Bank 
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2.4. Theoretical Framework 
2.4.1. Theory of Information asymmetry in credit market 
Information asymmetry exists between parties who enter into a financial transaction but do not 
possess same information that affects their agreement leading to contractual incompleteness 
(Rao, 2003). In this case, a party that has more information takes advantage of the less-informed 
one and acts unfairly.  
 
Asymmetric information in a credit market may exist when borrowers have more information 
about themselves than lenders. In this situation, lenders are unaware of borrowers’ behaviour and 
fail to discern delinquency, thereby impairing financial markets (Stefan & Ra, 2013). Borrowers 
tend to withhold information from banks at loan application stage when they know that such 
information will lead to banks giving them credit with strict terms or denying them credit 
altogether. 
 
When credit is granted to delinquent borrowers, banks only realise that they have asymmetric 
information upon default. However, if lenders have a way of assessing borrowers’ behaviour ex 
ante, they are able to draw contracts that cover against delinquency, thereby reducing the 
likelihood of loss. 
 
2.4.2. Theory of moral hazard 
According to Rao (2003), moral hazard occurs ex post, implying that the unobserved behaviour 
of one party makes it unfairly benefit from a contract by not acting in good faith. In the credit 
market, borrowers may withhold important information or mislead lenders to accrue benefits 
misaligned with the purpose of the contract.  
Borrowers tend to act dishonestly when banks cannot access true information about them. They 
may take loans from various financiers and divert such funds to riskier projects, thus creating 
moral hazards. “Moral hazard problem implies that a borrower has the incentive to default unless 
there are consequences for his future application for credit”, claims Wandera (2013). In addition, 
Rao (2003) stresses that moral hazards arise when a decision to enter into a contract was based 
on shared information until the other party, in this case, a borrower, diverts the funds.  
Due to a lower rate of loan repayment in a market with moral hazard, credit is granted at more 
expensive terms, thereby creating a problem of adverse selection (Kerage & Jangono, 2014). 
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2.4.3. Theory of adverse selection 
Adverse selection in the credit market occurs when there is asymmetric information and the 
contract signed excludes good borrowers as lenders attempt to ward off bad ones. Sharpe (1990) 
postulates that the failure of banks to differentiate between good and bad borrowers results in 
banks charging high interest rates on minimal-risk clients. As banks resort to pricing credit higher 
by raising interest rates to discourage delinquent borrowers who may default, good borrowers 
are discouraged from taking loans, resulting in adverse selection (Davis, 1994). 
Banks effectively combat banking crises and credit risks by sharing borrower credit information 
(Büyükkarabacak & Valev, 2012; Kusi, B.A., Agbloyor, E.K., Adu, K., & Gyeke, A., 2017). 
Pagano and Jappelli (1993) advocate for credit information sharing among lenders, citing 
benefits such as growth of industry loan book, efficiency in loan allocation and policy 
implications. Sharing credit information enables banks to sift good borrowers from bad ones, 
thereby lending appropriately in line with their risk appetite. Bad borrowers are unlikely to obtain 
credit and, if they do, banks will require strict credit terms to guard against borrowers’ 
delinquency. 
Raising interest rates to discriminate against risky borrowers has proven ineffective as it yields 
negative results. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) claim that banks’ profitability will decline if they 
raised interest rates beyond a certain point as this denies other customers loans thereby rationing 
credit. Stefan and Ra (2013) agree with Stiglitz and Weiss (2018) that risky borrowers are willing 
to pay higher interest rates on their loans while borrowers who have less risk will not. Raising 
interest rates on loans in the absence of adequate borrowers’ credit history serves as an 
impediment to credit extension and hence bank profitability. 
 
2.4.4. Theory of Credit Rationing 
While interest rates that lenders charge on loans may prohibit some borrowers from acquiring 
credit, risk-inclined borrowers may still acquire loans and expose lenders to credit risks and lower 
than expected return. Credit rationing exists where lenders issue smaller loans than those required 
by borrowers thereby rationing credit to reduce their exposure to loss should borrowers default. 
This approach is not optimal as some good borrowers may also be excluded from credit (Miller, 
2000). 
There are propositions that suggest that the demand for credit is never equal to its supply. By not 
extending credit to their potential, lenders incur opportunity costs.  This has a negative 
implication on the profitability of banks. Due to limited capital resources and imposed lending 
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limits, banks choose who to lend to and who to deny credit. Due to credit rationing and adverse 
selection, lenders realise lower revenue as they forego opportunities to lend to good borrowers. 
On the other hand, they further lose capital due to borrowers’ delinquency. This dilemma in 
credit decision-making can be addressed thorugh use of credit information sharing as a 
mechanism to counter information asymmetry.  
 
2.4.5. Credit information sharing as panacea 
The exchange of quality credit information gives banks incentives to lend more to good 
borrowers thereby encouraging economic growth (Soedarmono, W., Sitorus, D., & Tarazi, A., 
2017). When banks have information about potential borrowers, they tend to lend on reasonable 
terms and, in turn, good borrowers service their loans satisfactorily and qualify for more lending. 
This stimulates economic activity as banks realise returns on their assets. Information on 
borrowers’ credit patterns enables banks to effectively distinguish between good and bad 
borrowers without raising lending rates (Asongu, 2017) thereby addressing the problem of 
adverse selection (Gietzen, 2016; Jappelli & Pagano, 2005). 
 
Jappelli and Pagano (2005) posit that sharing credit information allows banks to make informed 
credit decisions, instil discipline in borrowers and further prevents them from multiple borrowing 
trends. It is however, important to note that sharing consumer credit information increases access 
to finance that can inadvertently result in increased bank credit risk (Nikolaos & Mamatzakis, 
2017). Furthermore, incorporating borrower credit information in credit decision making 
improves bank asset quality (Makomeke, Makomeke, & Chitura, 2016). 
 
However, Grajzl and Laptieva (2016) and Jappelli and Pagano (2005) believe that the sharing of 
borrowers’ credit information has ambiguous results. These authors argue that banks may refrain 
from lending if they feel a borrower is delinquent, thereby, on aggregate, lowering the volumes 
of credit extension. While that could be the case, banks would still benefit  by using credit 
reference systems to distinguish between good and bad borrowers. 
 
2.5. Empirical Review 
There is a wealth of research work on the issues of credit and banks’ performance. A decline in 
bank asset quality has been a challenge for many economies as borrowers default on their loans. 
Studies conducted suggest numerous causes for non-performing loans and make policy 
recommendations. The scope of this review focuses on the impact that sharing borrowers’ credit 
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history has on banks’ performance. The following sections discuss literature covering 
information sharing, bank asset quality and bank profitability. 
 
2.5.1. Credit Information sharing 
Banks that use credit information sharing systems significantly reduce credit risks, thereby 
contributing to improved bank performance (B. A. Kusi, 2015; B. A. Kusi et al., 2017). When 
banks have information about borrowers, they are able to draw up balanced contracts in order to 
give cheaper loans to good customers while tightening loan terms to risky borrowers (Cressy & 
Toivanen, 2001). 
 
Kusi and Agbloyor (2016) studied the effects of credit information sharing in Ghana using the 
panel data approach. They found that, when banks use credit bureaus, they significantly reduce 
credit risk. They also found that bank capital, size, loan concentration, GDP growth rate and 
inflation significantly influence bank credit risk. 
 
Consistent with previous findings, B. A. Kusi, Ansah-Adu, Kwadjo, & Owusu-Dankwa, (2015)  
found that banks in Ghana have improved profitability and asset quality and fewer non-
performing loans after the introduction of credit information sharing in the country. Riungu 
(2014) comes to a similar conclusion in his study on the effects of credit reference bureaus on 
commercial bank profitability. These findings are important to this study as they indicate the 
impact of information sharing on banks’ performance, their asset quality and NPL trends at a 
country level. 
 
Wanjiku (2015) evaluated the role of credit information sharing in combating NPLs in Kenya. 
Employing descriptive statistics, factor analysis and regression on primary and secondary data, 
the results revealed credit information sharing to be one of the factors that significantly affect 
NPLs. Wanjiku (2015) however shows that banks do not make final credit decisions in cases of 
borrowers’ negative credit information. Banks either seek collateral or investigate the client 
further in seeking ways to ensure loan repayment. While Wanjiku (2015) did not investigate the 
success rate of banks that lend to clients who have negative credit information, it is nevertheless 
very important to find out how such loans performed. 
 
Soedarmono et al. (2017) discovered that the use of a private credit bureau, not public credit 
registries, are effective in extenuating systemic bank risk as it accrues from credit risk. 
Soedarmono et al. (2017) suggest that quality credit information sharing through private credit 
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bureaus is essential in combating excessive loan growth effects and subsequent systemic risk in 
the financial sector. This paper explored how abnormal loan growth affects bank systemic risk 
in emerging markets, with examples from banks in the Asian Pacific region. 
 
Soedarmono et al.’s (2017) results are further verified by Behr and Sonnekalb, (2012) who 
investigated the effects of information sharing on loan performance, access to and cost of credit 
in Albania. This study reveals that credit information sharing over a public credit registry does 
not improve access to credit (Behr & Sonnekalb, 2012). The researchers further found that even 
though loan performance improves, the introduction of a public credit registry does not affect the 
cost of credit thus suggesting that borrowers become mindful of their credit history as it has 
implications for their credit affordability in the future. 
 
Only one form of credit information sharing mechanism exists in Lesotho, therefore this study 
does not distinguish between the operations of a public credit registry and private credit bureaus. 
The use of a public credit registry in sharing borrower credit information is however discouraged 
by the findings of (Grajzl & Laptieva, 2016a). When assessing the impact of information sharing 
on the volume of private credit by examining unique bank-level panel data from Ukraine, the 
results reveal that the effect of using private credit bureaus in information sharing results in an 
increased volume of credit activity at bank level, thereby suggesting a reduction in overall credit 
risk. These results are in line with the expectation in the current study. While this work assesses 
credit information through a private credit bureau in Lesotho, the researcher anticipates that 
banks realise the value in using credit information bureaus as their asset quality improves, 
thereby boosting their appetite for lending futher.  
 
Ngugi and Nasieku (2016) examined the effect of credit information sharing on credit risk in 
Kenyan commercial banks. This research used primary data from 42 banks in Kenya  
while secondary data was sourced from the Central Bank of Kenya. The findings of this 
study suggest that using borrower credit information from the credit information  
bureau helped in the management of credit risk in these banks. Studies by Riungu (2014) and 
Alloyo (2013) confirm these results by highlighting that the use of credit information bureaus in 
Kenya resulted in improved credit risk management and profitability at bank level. 
 
A study by Bos, De Haas, and Millone, (2013) found that loan quality improves when lenders 
share credit information of borrowers. This study by Bos, et al. (2013) suggests that the 
improvement in asset quality was due to restrained lending by banks. Contrary to previously 
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reviewed literature, this study further found that using credit information sharing mechanisms 
was associated with smaller loans, shorter loan maturity and increased interest rates mostly in 
high-competition regions. These results agree with the findings of Grajzl and Laptieva (2016b) 
as discussed earlier. 
 
2.5.2. Information sharing and bank profitability 
Although a considerable weight of evidence points to the fact that credit information sharing has 
a positive impact on bank profitability, there are findings that contradict this notion. Due to these 
conflicting findings, it is important to investigate whether credit information sharing actually 
improves bank performance. Below is a discussion of the relationships that several studies reveal 
between credit information sharing, credit risk management and bank profitability.  
 
Evidence from Kenya points out that credit information sharing resulted in improved bank 
performance in that country (Kerage & Jagongo, 2014). This is further confirmed by Thuo (2016) 
who undertook a study to investigate the effects of credit information sharing on the financial 
performance of 43 commercial banks in Kenya. The results of this study show a negative 
relationship between capital adequacy and financial performance of banks while also establishing 
a negative insignificant relationship between credit information sharing, asset quality and bank 
performance. The conclusion drawn was that failure to share credit information results in 
increased credit risk and subsequent poor financial performance of banks. 
 
Furthermore, B. Kusi et al., (2016) tested the effect of using credit bureau reports on bank 
profitability in Ghana. Using Prais-Wintsen panel regression, this study covered 25 banks over a 
period of 4 years and revealed that exchange of borrower information through credit bureau 
impacted positively on bank profits. This implies that banks were able to eliminate bad borrowers 
from the loan application process and lended to faithful ones thereby securing good returns over 
successful repayments. Furthermore this study argues that the use of credit information bureau 
reduced banks’ operating costs thereby contributing to bank viability. The current study has 
similarities to the one by B. Kusi et al., (2016). In addition, it incorporates credit growth as 
another dependent variable to establish the direct impact of credit information to banks’ ability 
in growing their loanbooks. 
 
Another study done in Kenya suggests that credit information sharing contributes profoundly to 
the performance of deposit taking savings and credit cooperatives (SACCOs) Kioko and Wario 
(2014). A total of 60 SACCOs were observed in this study. Using primary data, descriptive and 
 19 
 
inferential statistical data analysis methods were employed. SPSS was used to process collected 
data. 
 
Though the expectation in this current study is that managing credit risk by using borrowers’ 
credit history improves banks’ profits there is however evidence that contradicts this postulation. 
Nikolaos and Mamatzakis (2017) assert that a high level of information sharing could induce a 
habit of default in borrowers, as borrowers know that their good credit history would still 
outweigh their default incidents when applying for credit in the future. Such borrowers would 
default advertently. 
 
Furthermore, Otete, Muturi, & Mogwambo (2016) found that information sharing insignificantly 
influenced the profitability of banks operating in Kisii county in Kenya while Jappelli & Pagano 
(2005) point out that it is inconclusive that sharing borrower credit history may have an effect on 
the volume of bank credit. They argue that an increase in lending to good borrowers may not 
offset a reduction in lending to risky borrowers. This ambiguity in the effect of underwriting 
loans with borrower credit history leads to conflicting findings by different researchers. 
 
Furthermore, the findings of Saeed and Zahid (2016) on credit risk at five big UK banks, namely, 
HSBC, Barclays, Royal Bank of Scotland, Lloyds Banking Group and Standard Chartered Bank 
contradict the phenomenon of using credit information bureaus to realise improved profitability 
at banks. Their study suggests that these banks took risk by lending to borrowers whom they 
would otherwise not and yet realised increased profitability, thus they did not base their credit 
decisions on the credit worthiness of borrowers but they rather charged higher fees and interest 
rates. This study considered return on asset and return on equity as endogenous variables. Using 
quantitative data from these banks in the UK for a period from 2007 to 2015, the study used loan 
impairrments and non-performing loans as exogenous variables. 
 
There is also evidence that credit risk discourages banks from lending more, resulting in 
declining profits. Cucinelli (2015) studied the impact of non-performing loans on bank lending 
behaviour for 488 banks in Italy. Using primary data sourced from these banks for a period 
between 2007 and 2013, the findings suggest that credit risk negatively affected bank lending 
behaviour. Thus, due to increasing non-performing loans, banks cut back on their lending 
appetite, further hampering profits. However, this study does not suggest how banks could 
possibly manage credit risk. Information on borrowers’ delinquency and their overall credit 
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history can be used to project their future behaviour and further serve in determining the 
probability of default after granting loans (Jappelli & Pagano, 2005). 
 
Moreover, there is confirmation that credit information sharing reduces the risk of default at bank 
level, improves profitability and aggregate output. Houston et. al. (2010) found a positive 
relationship between credit information sharing and bank profitability. Studying the behaviour 
of over 2400 banks in 69 countries on creditor rights, information sharing and bank risk taking, 
they discovered that credit information sharing not only stimulates bank profitability but also 
lowers the numbers of non-performing loans and improves economic growth. This study 
explored five data sets, namely, bank-level accounting information; World Bank’s “Doing 
Business” data set and bank crises at country level. 
 
Swamy (2015) modelled bank asset quality and profitability in India. Using panel data for a 
period from 1997 to 2009, he employed the panel least squares method. This study used 
macroeconomic and industry specific variables as determinants of bank profitability. The 
findings suggested that among other variables, investment to deposit ratio, return on investment 
and return on advances have a positive and significant impact on bank profitability. The cost of 
funds, the ratio of gross non-performing assets to total assets and operating expenses to total 
assets had significantly negative impact on the return on assets. These findings show that the 
failure to manage credit risk at bank level leads to declining profitability. 
 
A study by Kerage and Jangono (2014), on credit information sharing and performance of 
commercial banks in Kenya revealed that NPLs’, level of interest rates, operation costs and 
volume of lending had significant effects on the return on assets, thereby influencing banks’ 
profitability. While Kerage and Jagongo (2014) use interest rate as a determinant of return on 
assets in their model, the current study refrains from using this variable in accordance with a 
finding that increased information sharing may lead to reduced bank interest margins (Nikolaos 
& Mamatzakis, 2017). 
 
Sound credit risk management improves bank profitability as proved by the findings of Ndoka 
and Islami (2016) who investigated the impact of credit risk management in the profitability of 
Albanian commercial banks. Despite the fact that the authors do not test credit risk management 
through the use of credit information bureaus, their findings are consistent with the other studies 
discussed in this paper. Those findings are relevant to this research as it uses return on assets as 
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a measure of bank profitability while adapting capital adequacy ratio as one of the exogenous 
variables in the regression model. 
 
This paper accepts that credit information sharing would not be the only cause for improved bank 
profitability as Trujillo-Ponce (2013) attributed bank profitability to such factors as a large 
volume of loans, high deposits and low credit risk. However, other authors note that credit 
information sharing attenuates credit risk (Jappelli & Pagano, 2002; B. A. Kusi & Agbloyor, 
2016). There is therefore interest in whether the exchange of credit information does contribute 
to bank profitability at all, thus establishing a link between credit information sharing and bank 
performance. 
 
This study has similarities to a study by Mugwe and Oliweny (2015) who investigated the effect 
of information sharing on the performance of commercial banks in Kenya. The authors assessed 
return on equity, return on assets and net interest margin on Kenyan banks. They observed these 
variables before and after establishment of credit reference bureaus. Employing a number of 
credit reports as an exogenous variable in their model to determine the impact of information 
sharing on profits of these banks, their study found that post establishment of credit reference 
bureaus, return of equity, return on assets and net interest margin improved significantly, 
implying that the credit information sharing initiative improved banks’ viability. This paper 
intends to add further exogenous variables to our model. In addition, it refrains from using the 
number of credit reports accessed to determine credit bureau usage as such data is not yet aequate 
given the recency of inception of credit bureau in Lesotho. 
 
2.5.3. Information sharing and credit growth 
Sharing of borrower credit history among lenders can arguably impact lending in two opposite 
ways. Lenders may find borrowers to be risky and decline them credit while on the other hand, 
borrowers may prove to be less risky, thus allowing banks to lend them more. 
 
Koros (2013) studied the effect of credit information sharing on the credit market performance, 
surveying 43 commercial banks in Kenya. In this study the effect of credit information sharing 
was tested before and after operationalization of credit bureau in the country. His findings 
pointed to the fact that credit performance as measured by ratio of performing loans to gross 
loans improved after the credit bureau was established. This finding agrees with Jappelli and 
Pagano (2002) who found that countries where lenders shared information on borrowers 
experienced higher bank lending and lower rates of default. In this situation, lenders may have 
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been able to properly assess creditworthiness of their prospective clients and developed some 
confidence from availed borrower credit history. However, the current research argues that if 
such borrowers appeared to be delinquent, volumes of bank lending would have declined. 
  
Futher evidence that exchange of credit information results in higher bank lending is provided 
by Grajzl and Laptieva (2016a), who found significant and positive relationship between credit 
information sharing and bank leding in Ukraine when such information is shared particularly 
through a private credit bureau. James et al. (2017) provide a similar finding that presence of 
credit information sharing system had a positive effect on credit volumes in Kenya. In addition, 
Machoka and Wamugo (2018) resonated these findings and argued that sharing of credit  
information results in higher bank lending volumes. 
 
The current study considers these findings and aims at testing the effect of credit information 
sharing among banks in Lesotho on credit volumes. While literature discussed above points to a 
positive effet of credit information exchange on bank lending, the researcher argues that if 
borrowers’ credit history is negative, bank lending will decline when banks acquire such 
borrower information. 
 
2.5.4. Asset quality and bank profitability 
Swamy (2015) asserts that good asset quality influences higher performance at bank level, thus 
bank profits are a function of fewer non-performing loans. This argument echoes the findings of 
Adeolu (2014) and Laidroo & Kadri (2003) that asset quality significantly influences bank 
profits. Accruing non-performing loans deteriorates the quality of assets and reflects negatively 
on performance outlook. While a number of factors determine non-performing loans at bank 
level, this paper focuses on banks’ inability to distinguish between good and bad borrowers as a 
primary cause of this phenomenon. 
 
2.5.5. Information sharing and asset quality 
Pagano and Jappelli (1993) noted that as a result of sharing borrowers’ credit information, banks 
were able to lend more to good borrowers, thus accumulating a good loan book. This assertion 
is supported by Bennardo, Pagano, and Piccolo (2007) and Hengel (2010) who emphasised that 
credit information sharing reduces borrower over-indebtedness and default rates. These findings 
support the researcher’s opinion that the sharing of borrower credit information facilitates 
lenders’ default predictive power during the lending decision stage. The sharing of borrowers’ 
credit history then results in improved bank asset quality as loans are advanced to good borrowers 
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instead of delinquent ones. In addition, as posited by Doblas-Madrid and Minetti (2013) and Kusi 
and Ansah-adu (2015), borrowers tend to service their loans when they are aware that their credit 
history is used to assess their future borrowings. This improves asset quality on the side of banks 
as credit information sharing incentivises borrowers to repay. 
 
2.6. Summary 
The literature reviewed in this chapter points to the fact that the lack of adequate borrower 
information leads to delinquency in the credit market. The theoretical postulations of Pagano and 
Jappelli (1993) form the foundation of the researcher’s argument that the exchange of borrowers’ 
credit history improves credit market performance. However, the ambiguity that credit 
information sharing may have on bank lending volumes is noted (Jappelli & Pagano, 2005). 
 
The researcher notes the evidence presented that credit information sharing neither  
improves bank lending volumes (Bos et al., 2013) nor necessarily influences bank  
performance (Saeed & Zahid, 2016). There is however evidence showing that credit information 
sharing has a significant impact on bank performance and asset quality, as shown by Mugwe and 
Oliweny (2015). This research intends to address such argument by using trends in loan book 
growth and bank return on assets to draw conclusios on the matter in question. 
 
The studies discussed in this section outline the banks’ efficiency as a function of variablessuch 
as credit risk, interest rate, GDP and credit information sharing in several economies across the 
globe. This study emphasises how factoring borrower credit history into credit decision making 
affects bank performance and credit growth. This paper therefore contributes to the wealth of 
knowledge on credit information sharing through the perspective of the Lesotho banking sector. 
Since the operationalisation of credit bureaus in Lesotho, there has not been a study to assess its 
effectiveness in improving credit extension and bank’s profitability; this work is aimed at 
addressing the absence of empirical evidence in this area. 
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Chapter 3 
Methodology 
3.1. Introduction 
This section disusses procedures and methodology employed for data sampling, collection and 
analysis of the study and proposed estimation techniques. Finally, variables incorporated in the 
study are described. 
 
3.2. Research Design 
The study uses quantitative data analysis with the aim of testing the impact that sharing of 
borrowers’ credit information has on banking industry profits and levels of credit growth. Based 
on theoretical postulates, improved bank profit and loan growth and a decline in non-performing 
loans are expected as a results of credit information sharing inception in the banking system. 
 
3.3. Sample size, data type and data periods 
To evaluate the effect of credit information sharing on banking industry profitability and credit 
growth, this work uses time series data of the banking industry in Lesotho. Selected data set 
explores changes in the industry metrics over a period of 2007 to 2017. Quarterly secondary data 
of banking industry is gathered from Central Bank of Lesotho for the entire period under study. 
3.4. Analytical framework  
3.4.1 Model Specification 
This paper aims to investigate whether cointegration exists between bank profitability and credit 
information sharing and bank credit growth and credit information sharing in the banking 
industry in Lesotho. Thus, setting bank profitability and bank credit growth as dependent 
variables to credit information sharing. To achieve this objective an estimated model is specified 
as follows:  
 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐶𝐵𝐷𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐶𝐺 + 𝛼3𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑇𝐴𝑡 + ℰ𝑡   Equation 1 
𝐶𝐺𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐶𝐵𝐷𝑡 + ℰ𝑡     Equation 2 
 
Where: ROA is return on assets; CG is the rate of credit growth at bank level; 𝛼0is the constant 
term; 𝛼1,2,3,4 are shortrun coefficients to capture the effect of change in the x variables on the y 
variable; CB represents the use of credit information bureau through credit checks; CAR is 
capital adequacy ratio; NIITA is a non-interest income to total assets ratio; INF is level of 
inflation; and NPL is level of non-performing loans; 
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The model specified in equations 1 and 2 tests for longrun relationship between return on asset 
and credit information sharing levels and credit growth and its determining variables as explained 
above. This model follows that endogenous variables and exogenous variables in each equations 
are cointegrated. Equation 1 states that ROA is determined by 𝐶𝐵𝐷, CAR, CG and NIITA and 
the error term. The same goes for equation 2 which sets CG as a function of INF 𝐶𝐴𝑅 and CBD, 
while capturing other determining factors in the error term. 
 
3.5. Description of Variables 
The choice of variables for this study is influenced by previous studies that assess the impact of 
credit information sharing on bank asset quality and profitability. Various studies outline return 
on asset and return on equity as indicators for bank profitability while NPL ratio as indicator for 
bank asset quality. Table 2 below outlines variables used in this study, their computation and 
sources. 
Table 2:Description of variables 
Variables Description/Computation  Source 
Dependent variables 
1. Return on Asset (ROA) Profit before interest and tax/Total Assets CBL 
2. Credit Growth (Current loans – previous loans)/Previous 
loans 
CBL 
Independent variables 
3. Rate of inflation (INF) 
The rate at which prices increase as measured 
through consumer price index (CPI) 
CBL 
4. Credit Bureau dummy (CBD) 
Dummy variable representing presence of 
Credit bureau 
CBL 
5. Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) Total Equity/Total Assets CBL 
6. Non-Interest income to Total 
Assets (NIITA) 
Non-Interest Income/TA CBL 
 
i. Return on Assets (ROA) 
Return on assets is an accounting ratio that measures a company’s ability to realise profit with 
its assets. Bank loan book is a major asset that the bank has as it refers to loans issued out. High 
volume of loans implies high loan book. Interest and other fees charged on loans forms part of 
banks income from which expenses are deducted to arrive at profit. For purposes of this study, 
return on assets is captured as profit before tax and interest divided by total assets. High return 
on assets is preferred. 
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ii. Credit Growth 
Credit growth ratio is computed as amount of loans in the current period less amount of loans in 
the previous period divided by amount of loans in the old period. It is expected that bank credit 
growth positively influences bank asset quality. 
 
iii. Inflation 
Inflation indicates the rate at which price of selected basket of goods changes over time and 
affects consumers in several ways. Increasing prices of goods an services erode the strength of 
money, this results in fewer goods being bought with the same amount of money. Secondly, 
during high levels of inflation, the authorities raise interest rate (repo rate) to curbe the surging 
price inreases, this results in higher interest on loans and hence repayments. This could evoke 
loan defaults by stressed borrowers, resulting in losses (Staikouras & Wood, 2011). This metric 
is added in the model to asses how banks manage anticipated inflation fluctuations and how 
changes in prices affect borrowers’ loan management. Cite  
 
iv. Credit Bureau Dummy  
Borrower credit inquiries on credit bureau is used as a proxy for credit bureau. This figure is 
ideal as it reflects the extent to which banks incorporate borrower credit history when making 
credit decisions. This variable is expected to have a positive relationship with bank loan growth 
and profitability. 
 
v. Capital Adequacy Ratio 
This ratio measures how much of bank assets are financed through equity, in this study, this ratio 
is chosen to capture banks’ solvency by measuring their ability to absorb losses which accrue 
from customer delinquency (B. A. Kusi et al., 2017). Trujillo-Ponce (2013) posits that well 
capitalized banks perform better. This study therefore expects that CAR influences bank 
profitability in Lesotho. 
 
vi. Non-interest income to total assets ratio 
Banks do not generate revenue via loans only, there are other avenues such as investments, bank 
charges and commissions through which they maximise their profits. Ability of bank’s 
management to efficiently use these income streams will result in improved profitability and 
lesser risk concentration. This variable is included in the model to assess how banks use non-
interest revenue to realise profits. 
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3.6. Estimation Approach 
This study follows time series analysis techniques to establish the importance of incorporating 
borrower credit history in loan underwriting. Bank profit and level of credit growth are assessed 
as metrices of interest in this study. Time series data refers to data gathered on a set of variables 
across given time points (Gujarati, 2004). The error correction modeling is applied to reconcile 
the short run behaviour of the variables in question with their long run behaviour. Prerequisite to 
estimating the ECM, the explanatory and endogenous variables must have unit roots and be 
cointegrated (Koop, 2006).  
 
3.6.1. Unit root analysis 
The order of integration of time series is sensitive in modelling econometric relationships 
between varibles (Marketa & Darina, 2016). In the foremeost, unit root tests are run on variables 
in question to determine their level of stationarity. This study adopts the use of Dickey Fuller, 
Augmentented Dickey Fuller and the Phillips Perron tests for stationarity. Following these tests, 
appropriate transformation of nonstationary time series will be conducted to ensure that all time 
series are integrated of the same order before running estimations lest the estimation yields 
spurious results. 
 
3.6.2 Johansen Cointegration Tests 
Following unit root tests, the Johansen test for cointegration is applied to test existence of 
cointegration in the I(1) variables based on the estimation of the error correction model by 
maximum likelihood technique (Dwyer, 2014). When two variables, Y and X, are individually 
non-stationary yet their linear combination is stationary, such variables are said to be 
cointegrated. In other words, variables Y and X have a long run relationship. To ascertain this 
relationship, Johansen and Juselius (1990) proposed application of Johansen test for 
cointegration. 
 
To test whether cointegration exists between variables in this paper, the Johansen Trace  and 
Maximal Eigenvalue tests will be carried out (Asteriou & Stephen, 2011). These statistics test 
for rank of cointegration (Martin, 2003) for null hypothesis of no cointegration against the 
alternative hypothesis of cointegration through ascertaining existence of stochastic drift between 
the varibles of interest. Following test for cointergation of these variables, the logrun and the 
shortrun relationship is estimated through the error correction model which is discussed next.  
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3.6.3 Long run and short run analysis of Error Correction Model (ECM) 
The error correction model is developed to estimate the rate which determines convergence of 
the shortrun to long run responses of the dependent variable following movement in the 
independent variable (Harris & Sollis, 2003). Thus the ECM estimates the shortrun behaviour of 
dependent variable given the independent variable through the use of the use of the “equilibrium 
error term” (Gujarati, 2004). To answer research questions, the researcher developed a specific 
model that makes use of available data. 
 
Following Koop (2006), longrun behaviour of dependent variables is estimated through 
equations 1 and 2 while their short-run behaviour is estimated through regression models of the 
following form:  
 
△ 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 △ 𝐶𝐵𝐷𝑡 + 𝛼2 △ 𝐶𝐺𝑡 + 𝛼3 △ 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡 + 𝛼4 △ 𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑇𝐴𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑢𝑡−1 + ℰ𝑡 Equation 3 
△ 𝐶𝐺𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 △ 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑡 + 𝛼2 △ 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡 + 𝛼3 △ 𝐶𝐵𝐷𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑢𝑡−1 + ℰ𝑡     Equation 4 
 
Where: △ denotes first difference operator; the equilibrium error term, 𝑢𝑡−1 accrues from 
estimating equations 1 and 2. This error term is used to reconcile the short-run reposnse of 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 
and 𝐶𝐵𝑡 to their longrun behaviour through the ECM as posited by Granger representation 
theorem (Koop, 2006). Following estimation of parameters  𝛼1,2,3,4, from equations 3 and 4, the 
short-run relationships was estimated for ROA and CB, derving the coefficient of 𝑢𝑡−1, thus 
establishing the speed at which the dependent variable returns to equilibrium. 
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Chapter 4 
Discussion of Findings 
 
4.1. Introduction  
This chapter provides discussion of results of the study. First, the study presents descriptive 
statistics of data in the model followed by model diagnostic tests and lastly cointegration and 
error correctin mechanisms.  
 
4.2. Descriptive statistics 
This section presents descriptive statistics of distribution of variables used in this study, namely 
return on assets, capital adequacy ratio, natural logarithm of non-performing loans ratio, credit 
growth, inflation and non-interest income to total assets ratio. As seen in table 3, return on assets 
averaged 0.0747 and ranges from 0.041 to 0.1311. This means that on average, banks realised 
return on assets of 7.47% in the period under study. This estimated profits compares evenly to 
other countries (B. A. Kusi et al., 2015; Mathuva, 2009; Rengasamy, 2014; Sastrosuwito & 
Suzuki, 2011; Trujillo-Ponce, 2013). Presence of credit information averaged 0.4545 during the 
period of study. This means that almost half of the entire period under review, the credit 
information sharing mechanism was not present. The mean value of capital adequacy ratio was 
19% throughout the years under study. The relatively similar ratio was found by Shingjergji & 
Hyseni (2015) in Albanian banks while Ahmad, Ariff, & Skully, (2008) had earlier found a 13% 
average. This is a well cushioned condition compared to 8% regulatory and international 
threshold. 
Credit extension grew by an average of 4.73% in the years under study. This is a fair level of 
growth as higher levels pose a stability threat to the banking sector (Tovar, Garcia-escribano, & 
Martin, 2012). Over the study period, inflation averaged 1.45% below the targeted level of 
inflation has a ceiling of 6% beyond which authorities implement monetary measures to curb it 
within the acceptable levels.. The Bank non-interest income offers alternative revenue and level 
of diversification to bankers (Williams & Prather, 2010). In the years under review non-interest 
income as a ratio of total assets averaged 82.8%.  
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ROA 44 0.0701 0.0117 0.0400 0.0978 
CBD 44 0.4545 0 5037 0.0000 1.0000 
CG 44 0.0473 0.0439 -0.0434 0.1878 
CAR 44 0.1918 0.0249 0.1450 0.2572 
INF 44 0.0145 0.0087 -0.0005 0.0392 
NIITA 44 0.0499 0.0246 0.0358 0.1937 
Note: ROA=Retrun on Assets;CBD=Credit Bureau Dummy; CAR=Capital Adequacy Ratio; NIITA=Non-Interest 
Income to Total Assets ratio; INF=inflation and CG=Credit Growth; Source: Computations from research data 
 
4.3. Unit Root results  
The augmented dickey fuller (ADF) unit root tests is carried out to determine the level of 
stationarity of variables. The hypothesis tested is that variables are stationary at level against 
alternatie hypothesis that states that variables are stationary after first difference. As it can be 
seen in table 4, return on assets, capital adequacy ratio, non- interest income to total assets ratio 
and credit growth are non-stationary at level and stationary at first difference. This confirms that 
there might be long run relationship among the variables as this paper seeks to establish. 
 
Table 4: Unit Root Tests 
Variable level first difference 
Test statistic p-value Test statistics p-value 
ROA -2.816* 0.0560 -5.710*** 0.0000 
CBD -0.888 0.7921 -6.481*** 0.0000 
CAR -2.852* 0.0513 -5.942*** 0.0000 
CG -1.926 0.3199 -5.797*** 0.0000 
INF -2.969** 0.0379 -6.588*** 0.0000 
NIITA - 2.519 0.1110 -5.108*** 0.0000 
Note: ROA=Retrun on Assets; CBD=Credit Bureau Dummy; CAR=Capital Adequacy Ratio; NIITA=Non-Interest 
Income to Total Assets ratio; INF=inflation and CG=Credit Growth;***, ** and * denotes significance at 1%, 5% 
and 10% respectively. Source: Computations from research data 
 
4.4. Cointegration results: ROA Model 
The results of the cointegration test to examine the long run equilibrium relationship is presented 
in table 5. The trace and eigenvalues statistics of the result of the Johansen cointegration test of 
the ROA model both suggests the existence of cointegration among variables, thus there exists 
long run relationship between return on assets and credit bureau, capital adequacy ratio, credit 
growth and non-interest income to total assets ratio. Based on outcome of these results, the error 
correction model is run to determine the short run relationship of these variables. 
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Table 5: Co-Integration Rank Test-ROA 
Hypothesized 
No. of CE(s) 
Eigen 
values 
Trace Maximum Eigen Value 
Trace 
Statistic 
0.05 
Critical Value 
Trace 
Statistic 
0.05 
Critical Value 
None * - 90.0484 68.52 36.4633 33.46 
At most 1 0.58028 53.5850 47.21 24.3228 27.07 
At most 2 0.43961 29.2622 29.68 16.0887 20.97 
At most 3 0.31823 13.1736 15.41 12.3486 14.07 
At most 4 0.25473 0.8250 3.76 0.8250 3.76 
At most 5 0.01945     
 
4.5. Conintegration Results: CG Model 
The results of the cointegration test to examine the long run equilibrium relationship is presented 
in table 6. The trace and eigenvalues statistics of the result of the Johansen cointegration test of 
the CG model both suggest the existence of cointegration among variables, thus there exists long 
run relationship between level of credit growth and inflation, non-perfroming loans and usage of 
credit bureau system. Based on outcome of these results, the error correction model is run to 
determine the short run relationship of these variables. 
 
Table 6: Co-Integration Rank Test -CG 
Hypothesized 
No. of CE(s) 
Eigen 
values 
Trace Maximum Eigen Value 
Trace 
Statistic 
0.05 
Critical Value 
Maximum 
Statistic 
0.05 
Critical Value 
None * - 65.7452 47.21 29.0394 27.07 
At most 1 0.49913 36.7058 29.68 25.2786 20.97 
At most 2 0.45221 11.4273 15.41 10.4722 14.07 
At most 3 0.22068 0.9551 3.76 0.9551 3.76 
At most 4 0.02248     
Note: Trace test indicates 1 co-integrating equation(s) at the 0.05 level. * denotes rejection of 
the hypothesis at the 0.05 level. **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values. 
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4.6.  Corelation Analysis 
Results of correlation matrix for preditor variables show absence of multicollinearity, thus no 
independent variable has perfect relationship with the other in the model. 
 
Table 7:Correlation Matrix 
 ROA CBD CAR NIITA INF CG 
ROA 1      
CBD 0.0858 1     
CAR 0.0624 -0.5525 1    
NIITA 0.4946 0.2980 -0.1246 1   
INF -0.1496 -0.2384 0.2232 -0.1000 1  
CG 0.1616 -0.4769 0.2023 0.1293 0.1679 1 
Note: ROA=Retrun on Assets; CBD=Credit Bureau Dummy; CAR=Capital Adequacy Ratio; NIITA=Non-Interest Income to 
Total Assets ratio; INF=inflation and CG=Credit Growth; Source: Computations from research data 
 
4.7.  Long-run Results –retrun on assets model 
The results of the relationship between bank profitability and credit information sharing is 
presented in table 8. The regression equation for long run relationship between variables was 
estimated using the OLS regression. The test of the joint null hypothesis that all the coefficients 
included in the model except for the intercept are zero is rejected at 5% ( F-statistic 3.57). The 
conclusion made is that the model used is significant. In addition, the coefficient of determination 
(R2) of 0.2679 indicates that the independent variables collectively explain 26.79% of total 
variation of return on assets, thus there may be other variables which explain the remaining 
73.21% of variation in the dependent variable. However, for the purpose and the objective of this 
research, the chosen variables are accepted as the overall p-value for the model is 0.0142 which 
indicates overall model validity. Moreover, the R2 and the DW statistics show that the model is 
not spurious. 
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Table 8:Long run results for return on assets 
 Coef. Std Error t-statistic P-value 
CBD 0.001657 0.004652 0.356174 0.7236 
CAR 0.0658888 0.077975 0.844993 0.4033 
NIITA 0.226938 0.072393 3.134810 0.0033*** 
CG 0.028189 0.044217 0.637511 0.5275 
Constant 0.0440624 0.016499 2.670606 0.0110** 
R-squared 0.2679 
F(4,39) 3.57 
Prob > F 0.0142 
observations 44 
AIC -6.163412 
Schwartz Criterion -5.960663 
Hannan-Quinn Criterion -6.088223 
Durbin Watson 1.399192 
Note: ROA=Retrun on Assets; CBD=Credit Bureau Dummy; CAR=Capital Adequacy Ratio; NIITA=Non-Interest Income to 
Total Assets ratio; INF=inflation and CG=Credit Growth; ; *** and ** denotes significance at 1% and 5% respectively. Source: 
Computations from research data 
 
A positive and insignificant log run relationship was observed between the existence of credit 
information bureau and bank profitability which indicates that the introduction of the CIB has 
not had a plausible impact on bank profitability. Nikolaos and Mamatzakis (2017) established 
that there was a negative relationship between introduction of credit information sharing and 
bank profitability. Such negative impact could however be due to capital expenditure, staff 
training and other initial costs related to banks’ connectivity to credit bureau systems.  
 
The effect of capital adequacy ratio (CAR) on profitability was observed to be poitive and 
insignificant in the long run. A priory expectations and previous studies point out that a positive 
relationship between capital adequacy and bank profitability indicates that banks’ ability to 
absorb loans losses which then resulted in improved profitability (Mathuva, 2009; Olalekan & 
Adeyinka, 2013; Pasiouras & Kosmidou, 2007; Staikouras & Wood, 2011; Trujillo-Ponce, 
2013). However, Mendoza and Rivera (2017) established that capital adequacy did not influence 
profitability of rural banks in Phillipines while (Osborne, Fuertes, & Milne, 2012) found a 
negative relationship between capital asequacy and bank profit.  
 
Furthermore, a positive and significant relationship was observed in the long run between ratio 
of non-interest income to total assets (NIITA) and bank return on assets which indicates banks’ 
ability to diversify their business operations such that they do not thrive on interest income alone. 
With respect to the estimated coefficient, a 1% increase in non-interest income results in 0.2269 
units rise in profitability. This finding is consistent with Pasiouras and Kosmidou, (2007), Sufian 
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and Chong (2008) and Staikouras and Wood (2011) who established that banks which diversify 
their portfolio realised more profits than those that relied heavily on revenue from loans. There 
are however studies that found otherwise (Adzobu, Agbloyor, & Aboagye, 2017). Such items as 
commissions, fees and other investments do contribute to bank profitability. Banks’ ability to 
diversify their revenue provides a cushion for periods where their loan portfolios are not 
performing well.  
 
Long run model residuals were tested for stationarity and null hypothesis of unit root was rejected 
at 5% level, thus leading to conclusion that jointly, the variables were stationary, thus allowing 
for estimation of error correction model results of which are discussed next. 
 
4.8.  Short-run error correction results of return on assets model 
To establish a short run relationship of these variables, the error correction model is run. 
Importantly, the error term in long run model is used as an equilibrium term in the short run 
model, thus, reconciling the long run and short behaviour of ROA with respect to the explanatory 
variables. The results of the error correction model are presented in table 9. This model ties the 
long run behaviour of the independent variable to the deterministic variables. The test of the joint 
null hypothesis that all the coefficients included in the model except for the intercept are zero 
was rejected at 5% ( F-statistic 6.71) while the overall p-value for the model is 0.0002 indicating 
model validity. In addition, the coefficient of determination (R2) of 0.4757 indicates that the 
independent variables collectively explain 47.57% of total variation of return on assets. 
 
The significance of the lagged error correction term (Ut-1) reinforces the presence of long run 
relationship between variables and the adjustments from short run equilibrium. In line with a 
priori expectation and theory, this term is negative and significant at 1% level. This provides an 
important information on the short run relationship between credit growth and its determinants. 
The indication given by the estimated coefficient is that in the short run, ROA returns to 
equilibrium at a speed of 0.735. Thus, if ROA is above equilibrium, it will decay in the next 
period to correct the equilibrium error. 
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Table 9:Regression results of Error Correction Model of return on assets 
Model ROA Coef. Std Error t-statistics p-value 
△CBD 0.0044 0.01697 0.26 0.798 
△CAR 0.0588 0.06828 0.86 0.395 
△NIITA 0.1727 0.09010 1.92 0.063* 
△CG 0.0503 0.02801 1.80 0.080* 
Ut-1 -0.7348 0.16136 -4.55 0.0000*** 
Constant -0.0001 0.00116 -0.08 0.937 
R-squared 0.5248 
F(5,37) 8.17 
Prob > F 0.0000 
Number of observations 43 
AIC -5.892505 
Schwartz Criterion -5.646756 
Hannan-Quinn Criterion -5.801881 
Durbin Watson 1.850052 
Note: ROA=Retrun on Assets; CBD=Credit Bureau Dummy; CAR=Capital  
Adequacy Ratio; NIITA=Non-Interest Income to Total Assets ratio; INF=inflation and CG=Credit Growth;  
*** and * denotes significance at 1% and 10% respectively Source: Computations from research data 
 
4.9. Long-run Results -Credit Growth Model 
The results of the relationship between bank credit growth and credit information sharing is 
presented in table 10. The regression equation for long run relationship between variables was 
estimated using the OLS regression. The test of the joint null hypothesis that all the coefficients 
included in the model except for the intercept are zero is rejected at 5% ( F-statistic 4.14). The 
conclusion made is that the model used is significant. In addition, the coefficient of determination 
(R2) of 0.237 indicates that the independent variables collectively explain 23.7% of total variation 
of return on assets, thus there may be other variables which explain the remaining 76.3% of 
variation in the dependent variable. However, for the purpose and the objective of this research, 
the chosen variables are accepted as the overall p-value for the model is 0.012 which indicates 
overall model validity. Moreover, the R2 and the DW statistics show that the model is not 
spurious. 
 
Contrary to a priory expectation, a negative and significant long run relationship was observed 
between existence of credit information bureau and bank credit growth. With respect to the 
estimated coefficient, a 1% increase in usage of credit bureau lead to 0.045 units decline in credit 
extension. This result suggests that as banks conduct credit history inquiries on prospective 
borrowers, they reach decisions to deny them loans and advances. Banks may recline loan 
extension if borrowers are overidebted or are considered risky to lend. There are however, some 
contesting postulations on this relationship (James et al., 2017; Jappelli & Pagano, 2005; Loaba 
& Zahonogo, 2018). 
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Table 10:Long run results for Credit Growth 
 Coef. Std Error t-statistic P-value 
CBD -0.044837 0.014586 -3.073938 0.0038*** 
CAR -0.171028 0.294353 -0.581032 0.5645 
INF 0.338503 0.724400 0.467288 0.6428 
Constant 0.095562 0.060493 1.579731 0.1220 
R-squared 0.2370 
F(4,39) 4.14 
Prob > F 0.0120 
Number of observations 44 
AIC -3.525859 
Schwartz Criterion -3.3660 
Hannan-Quinn Criterion -3.465707 
Durbin Watson 2.3271 
Note: ROA=Retrun on Assets; CBD=Credit Bureau Dummy; CAR=Capital Adequacy Ratio; NIITA=Non-Interest Income to 
Total Assets ratio; INF=inflation and CG=Credit Growth; *** denotes significance at 1%. Source: Computations from 
research data 
 
4.10.  Short run results for CG 
Following estimation of long run behaviour of the variables, the short run behaviour is estimated 
and results presented below: From table 11, the coefficient of the error correction term, Ut-1 is 
statistically significant suggesting that credit growth is cointegrated with non-performing loans, 
usage of credit bureau systems and level of inflation. With respect to the estimated coefficient, 
the speed of adjustment for bank credit growth to return to equilibrium is 1.22 times changes in 
the exogenous variables. 
 
Table 11:Regression results of Error Correction Model of Credit Growth 
 Coef. Std Error t-statistic P-value 
△CBD 0.0413016 0.0379 1.09 0.283 
△CAR -0.4015108 0.2475 -1.62 0.113 
△INF 0.9769736 0.6085 1.61 0.117 
Ut-1 -1.219 0.1490 -8.18 0.000*** 
Constant -0.00273 0.0057 -0.48 0.636 
R-squared 0.6423 
F(4,38) 17.06 
Prob > F 0.0000 
Number of observations 43 
AIC -3.682 
Schwartz Criterion -3.477 
Hannan-Quinn Criterion -3.607 
Durbin Watson 1.98 
Note: ROA=Retrun on Assets; CBD=Credit Bureau Dummy; CAR=Capital Adequacy Ratio; NIITA=Non-Interest 
Income to Total Assets ratio; INF=inflation and CG=Credit Growth; *** denotes significance at 1%. Source: 
Computations from research data 
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Chapter 5 
Summary, Conclusion and Reccommendations  
5.1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to summarise the study by providing conclusions from the findings 
of this research work and pass policy recommendations for stakeholders. Finally, future research 
directions are suggested. 
 
5.2. Summary of findings 
Credit bureaus are instituted to aid lenders in predicting borrower behaviour based on their 
personal credit management. In order to enhance lenders’ predictive power, credit bureaus 
provide credit history of borrowers as it is believed that the best behavioural predictor is historical 
information (The Economist, 2009). This research examined the impact of using credit 
information of borrowers in making lending decision at banks in Lesotho. A summary of findings 
from the empirical work is discussed against the objectives of this paper below. 
 
5.2.1. Credit information sharing and bank profitability 
Return on assets metric was used as a proxy for measuring bank profitability. Presence of credit 
bureau was used to explain variation in bank profitability while credit growth, level of capital 
adequacy, and income diversification were incorporated in a model as control variables. From 
presented results, it is evident that credit information sharing in Lesotho has not improved bank 
profitability in the period under study. Rather, the study revealed significant long run relationship 
between bank profit and non-interest income, pointing out to management’s ability to diversify 
bank revenue. Moreover, levels of credit growth positively explained return on assets in the short 
run. 
 
5.2.2. Credit information sharing and bank credit growth 
As presented in the results of the study, the presence of credit bureau resulted in declining bank 
credit volumes in the long run. These results suggest that banks were initially lending to risky 
borrowers unknowingly before credit information bureau was established. The determinants of 
bank credit growth were found to be insignificant in the short run. Furthermore, credit growth 
seemed to return to equilibrium quite fast. 
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5.3. Conclusion 
The objectives of this study were to examine banks’ performance and credit growth in response 
to the presence of credit bureau in Lesotho on the premise that if banks lend to delinquent 
borrowers, they run a risk of not recovering, which in turn will affect their loanbook and 
subsequently their profitability. The argument passed was that when banks have more 
information about borrowers, they woud be able to make sound lending decisions, collect in time 
and realise profit in their operations. 
 
Return on assets was used as a proxy for profitability in this study while dummy variable was 
used to denote presence of credit bureau. The findings pointed to the fact that the presence of 
credit bureau does not affect bank profitability. Secondly, it was found that the presence of credit 
bureau resulted in declining bank credit growth. These findings are key to explain the link 
between declining credit volumes and insignificant impact of credit bureau on bank profits. 
Lower levels of credit growth indicate banks’ disincentive to lend, which in turn affect 
profitability. 
 
From these findings it is concluded that borrowers in Lesotho have characteristics of delinquency 
and do not meet banks’ credit policies. This is evidenced by the fact that upon increased borrower 
information throught reports from credit bureau, banks cut back on their lending. 
 
As the results of this study show that inception of credit information bureau in Lesotho did not 
lead to improved bank profitability and that banks reduced their loan extension, the following 
recommendations are passed. 
 
5.4. Recommendations 
This study recommends that banks, non-bank financial institutions, retailers and utility 
companies be actively and legally encouraged to share their clients’ credit information and 
further make credit history inquiries prior to lending. This way, credit information hosted at the 
bureau will be rich and effectively usable by lenders as rich and reliable borrower information 
will ai banks in making proper lending decisions. It is also recommended that consumers be made 
aware of the presence of credit bureau, it functions and the implications brought by their credit 
history, in this way, borrowers will make wise credit decisions and improve on their discipline 
in repaying their loans on time to avoid accumulating negative credit history. 
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Future research work should examine impact of credit information sharing on retailers and other 
non-bank lenders to establish overall impact of using borrower credit information system in the 
country.  
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